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Articles 
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT AS 
JEREMIAD 
Timothy P. O’Neill 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Paul Harding‘s 2010 Pulitzer Prize-winning novel Tinkers deals with 
three generations of fathers in New England.1  It illustrates V.S. 
Naipaul‘s observation that ―[i]t is as if we all carry in our makeup the 
effects of accidents that have befallen our ancestors, as if we are in many 
ways programmed before we are born, our lives half outlined for us.‖2 
Much of the novel takes place in the mind of George Washington 
Crosby, an elderly man on his death bed.  We learn of his grandfather, a 
failed minister who suffered a breakdown and was institutionalized by 
his wife.  We see the profound effect this had on Howard, the minister‘s 
son (and George‘s father).  Howard, an epileptic, years later discovered 
that his wife also planned to institutionalize him.  In order to escape his 
father‘s fate, Howard abandoned his wife and children (including 
George), moved to a new city, and began a new life. 
In response, Howard‘s son George became the epitome of the 
responsible, family-oriented man:  ―George could dig and pour the 
concrete basement for a house.  He could saw the lumber and nail the 
frame. He could wire the rooms and fix the plumbing.‖3  He is described 
as ―a fastidiously neat dresser.‖4  By the time of his death he had 
carefully accumulated numerous checking accounts, savings accounts, 
certificates of deposit, and safety-deposit boxes.5 
Everything in George‘s life reflected perfect order.  And this need for 
order was best illustrated in his passion for repairing clocks.  George 
became interested in this as an adult after he bought a clock at a tag sale.  
The owner also gave him a reprint of an Eighteenth Century clock repair 
manual.6  This turned into a very lucrative business for George. 
                                                 
 Professor, The John Marshall Law School.  This Article is dedicated to my wife Jane 
Rutherford, who has been a source of joy and inspiration to me for the last thirty-four 
years.  I also wish to acknowledge the excellent research assistance of Caitlyn McEvoy. 
1 PAUL HARDING, TINKERS (2009). 
2 V.S. NAIPAUL, THE ENIGMA OF ARRIVAL 77 (1987). 
3 HARDING, supra note 1, at 12. 
4 Id. at 48. 
5 Id. at 164–65. 
6 Id. at 14. 
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Interspersed throughout the novel are excerpts from the repair book 
supposedly published in 1783.  The passages combine details on clock 
repair with philosophical musings on the nature of time.  The book is 
entitled The Reasonable Horologist7 and is written by the Reverend Kenner 
Davenport.8  One of The Reasonable Horologist‘s more striking quotations 
describes re-assembling a clock and then goes on to contrast the nature 
of time in the universe with how it is perceived by mere mortals:  
―[n]ow, the horologist looks upon an open-faced, fairy-book contraption; 
gears lean to and fro like a lazy machine in a dream.  The universe‘s time 
cannot be marked thusly.  Such a crooked and flimsy device could only 
keep the fantastic hours of unruly ghosts.‖9 
The reader may wonder how Harding acquired this interest in a 
horologist‘s philosophical distinction between concepts of time.  There 
are several clues.  The New York Times has described Harding as ―an avid 
reader of 19th-century novels.‖10  Interestingly, in the novel George‘s 
father was given a first-edition of The Scarlet Letter dated 1852 and 
personally signed by Nathaniel Hawthorne.11  A Hawthorne aficionado, 
however, might recognize that The Scarlet Letter was actually published 
in 1850.12 
What American novel was published in 1852?  In an interview, 
Harding has admitted ―I love Melville.‖13  And in 1852 Melville 
published a novel that included an imaginary pamphlet containing a 
lecture entitled ―Chronometricals and Horologicals‖ that uses time as a 
metaphor for distinguishing divine truth from earthly experience. 
II.  HERMAN MELVILLE‘S CHRONOMETRICALS AND HOROLOGICALS 
The novel was Pierre; or, The Ambiguities.14  It was the book Melville 
published immediately after Moby Dick.15  Pierre was both a critical and 
                                                 
7 A horologist is ―a maker of clocks or watches.‖  Horologist, MERRIAM-WEBSTER‘S 
DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/horologist (last visited Sept. 
23, 2010). 
8 Dave Weich, Paul Harding Beats the Tar out of Time, POWELLS.COM (Dec. 29, 2008), 
http://www.powells.com/authors/paulharding.html.  In an interview with Harding, he 
confirms that The Reasonable Horologist is ―totally made up.‖  Id.  He also reveals that the 
name Kenner Davenport is an amalgam of the names of the critic Hugh Kenner and the 
writer Guy Davenport.  Id. 
9 HARDING, supra note 1, at 17. 
10 Motoko Rich, Mr. Cinderella:  From Rejection Notes to the Pulitzer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 
2010, at C5. 
11 HARDING, supra note 1, at 43.  
12 NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (Penguin Books 2009) (1850). 
13 See Weich, supra note 8. 
14 HERMAN MELVILLE, PIERRE; OR, THE AMBIGUITIES (Penguin Books 1996) (1852) 
[hereinafter PIERRE].  All references to passages in Pierre are from the 1996 edition. 
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financial failure.16  John Updike wrote that ―Pierre proved to 
be . . . grindingly, ludicrously bad. It is doubtful if elsewhere in the 
history of literature two books as good and bad as ‗Moby Dick‘ and 
‗Pierre‘ have been written back to back.‖17 
Despite this, the novel does contain one episode that deserves 
attention. In the middle of the book, Pierre finds a torn pamphlet 
containing a lecture entitled, as noted above, ―Chronometricals and 
Horologicals.‖18 The chronometer is a device used on ships that always 
provides Greenwich Mean Time wherever it is in the world. The 
lecturer—who Melville names ―Plotinus Plinlimmon‖—uses the 
regularity of the chronometer as a metaphor for unchanging divine 
truth. He then compares it to changeable, local, horological time: 
Now in an artificial world like ours, the soul of man is 
further removed from its God and the Heavenly Truth, 
than the chronometer carried to China, is from 
Greenwich.  And, as that chronometer, if at all accurate, 
will pronounce it to be 12 o‘clock high-noon, when the 
China local watches say, perhaps, it is 12 o‘clock 
midnight; so the chronometric soul, if in this world true 
to its great Greenwich in the other, will always, in its so-
called intuitions of right and wrong, be contradicting the 
                                                                                                             
15 HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK; OR, THE WHALE (Penguin Group 2009) (1851). 
16 Some of the contemporary reviews of Pierre are worth quoting at length.  See Charles 
Gordon Greene, THE BOSTON POST, Aug. 4, 1852 (―Pierre; or The Ambiguities is, perhaps, the 
craziest fiction extant. . . . [T]he amount of utter trash in the volume is almost 
infinite . . . . [W]e believe we shall never see the man who has endured the reading of the 
whole of it . . . .‖) (emphasis in original); George Washington Peck, NEW YORK AMERICAN 
WHIG REVIEW, Nov., 1852 (―A bad book! . . . [W]e never met with so turgid, pretentious, 
and useless a book as Pierre.‖); John R. Thompson, RICHMOND SOUTHERN LITERARY 
MESSENGER, Sept., 1852 (―[A]s for The Ambiguities, we are compelled to say that it seems to 
us the most aptly titled volume we have met with for years . . . . [L]eave [it] unbought on 
the shelves of the bookseller.‖); WASHINGTON NATIONAL ERA, Aug. 19, 1852 (―Truly is there 
‗but one step from the sublime to the ridiculous,‘ and as truly hath Mr. Melville herein 
accomplished it.‖); William Young, NEW YORK ALBION, Aug. 21, 1852 (―[A] dead 
failure . . . . [T]here is scarcely a page of dialogue that is not absurd to the last degree.‖).  All 
of these quotes can be found at Contemporary Criticism and Reviews, THE LIFE AND WORKS OF 
HERMAN MELVILLE, http://www.melville.org/hmpierre.htm#Contemporary (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2010).  Eight months after its publication Pierre had sold only 283 copies out of a 
first edition run of 2310; in Melville‘s entire lifetime, the royalties for Pierre amounted to 
$157.  John Updike, Reflections: Melville’s Withdrawal, THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 1982, at 
128. 
17 Updike, supra note 16, at 124. 
18 PIERRE, supra note 14, at 210–15. 
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mere local standards and watch-maker‘s brains of this 
earth.19 
The lecturer proceeds to imagine a genius, such as Francis Bacon, as 
a simple horologist, and then makes this comparison:  ―Bacon‘s brains 
were mere watch-maker‘s brains; but Christ was a chronometer; and the 
most exquisitely adjusted and exact one, and the least affected by all 
terrestrial jarrings, of any that have ever come to us.‖20  So why was 
Christ rejected during his time on earth?  ―[B]ecause he carried that 
Heaven‘s time in Jerusalem, while the Jews carried Jerusalem time 
there.‖21 
Does that mean that a person in China should reject the time 
expressed by his watches made by local horologists in favor of the 
universal chronometer?  No, because if he did so ―he would be guilty of 
all manner of absurdities:—going to bed at noon, say, when his 
neighbors would be sitting down to dinner.‖22 
But then what is the purpose of God revealing the ―heavenly 
chronometer‖23 to men?  Because although local horological time might 
―answer well enough here,‖ man must understand that his local time is 
―by no means universally applicable.‖  God wants to make known to 
man that ―the central Greenwich in which He dwells goes by a 
somewhat different method from this world.‖24 
What follows is perhaps the most important passage of the lecture:  
―[a]nd yet it follows not from this, that God‘s truth is one thing and 
man‘s truth another; but—as above hinted, and as will be further 
elucidated in subsequent lectures—by their very contradictions they are 
made to correspond.‖25  Unfortunately, we never learn what was contained 
in those subsequent lectures, because several paragraphs later Melville 
tells us ―[b]ut here the pamphlet was torn, and came to a most untidy 
termination.‖26 
And here is the irony.  As a novel, Pierre today is generally unread 
and ignored.  But as a part of American intellectual history, it occupies 
an important place.  That is because the ―Chronometricals and 
Horologicals‖ section of Pierre became the centerpiece of Sacvan 
                                                 
19 Id. at 211. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 212. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. (emphasis added). 
26 Id. at 215. 
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Bercovitch‘s argument in 1978 in his seminal work, The American 
Jeremiad.27 
III.  CHRONOMETRICALS AND HOROLOGICALS IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY 
AMERICA 
The standard definition of ―jeremiad‖ is ―a prolonged lamentation or 
complaint.‖28  The word is derived from the biblical prophet Jeremiah, 
who has traditionally been considered the author of two books of the 
Old Testament:  Jeremiah and Lamentations.  
The Book of Jeremiah predicts the downfall of the Kingdom of Judah 
because the people had broken the covenant with God:  ―I had planted 
thee a noble vine, wholly a right seed:  how then art thou turned into the 
degenerate plant of a strange vine unto me?‖29  And the Book of 
Lamentations is indeed an extended lament written after Jeremiah‘s 
prediction of Judah‘s downfall had come to pass.  It bemoans the fall of 
Judah in passages such as ―Judah is gone into captivity because of 
affliction . . . she dwelleth among the heathen, she findeth no rest:  all her 
persecutors overtook her . . . . [N]one come to the solemn feasts:  all her 
gates are desolate:  her priests sigh, her virgins are afflicted, and she is in 
bitterness.‖30 
Bercovitch describes what he calls the traditional ―European 
jeremiad‖ that dates back to religious practices in the Middle Ages.31  It 
was: 
[A] lament over the ways of the world.  It decried the 
sins of ―the people‖ . . . and warned of God‘s wrath to 
follow.  Generation after generation, from the medieval 
era through the Renaissance, Catholic and then 
Protestant audiences heard the familiar refrain. . . . All of 
history proved it:  humanity was naturally 
depraved. . . . The preachers used [Biblical] texts in their 
jeremiads as moral lessons, but the texts themselves held 
out little hope, if any.32 
                                                 
27 SACVAN BERCOVITCH, THE AMERICAN JEREMIAD (1978). 
28 Jeremiad, MERRIAM-WEBSTER‘S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/jeremiad (last visited Sept. 23, 2010). 
29 Jeremiah 2:21. 
30 Lamentations 1:3–4. 
31 BERCOVITCH, supra note 27, at 7. 
32 Id. 
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The most famous analysis of the transfer of the jeremiad from 
Europe to America was offered by Perry Miller in 1956 in his classic 
study Errand into the Wilderness.33  Miller‘s thesis was that the Puritan 
―errand‖ changed dramatically during the Seventeenth Century.  Miller 
described the first concept of the errand as dating from the Great 
Migration of 1630.  These Puritans did not see themselves as ―a battered 
remnant of suffering Separatists thrown up on a rocky shore.‖34  On the 
contrary, they saw themselves as ―an organized task force of 
Christians . . . [who] went [to America] in order to work out that 
complete reformation which was not yet accomplished in England and 
Europe, but which would quickly be accomplished if only the saints back 
there had a working model to guide them.‖35  Quite literally, in the 
famous words of John Winthrop, they thought ―that wee shall be as a 
Citty upon a Hill, the eies of all people‖ watching.36 
After the collapse of Cromwell‘s Protectorate in 1660, however, the 
Puritans no longer felt that King Charles II‘s England would ever look to 
them as an example.37  Thus, they turned from looking outward—being a 
model for others—to looking inward.  As Miller expresses it, ―[they] 
found that they had no other place to search but within themselves—
even though, at first sight, that repository appeared to be nothing but a 
sink of iniquity.‖38 
Thus, the Puritans had to re-define their mission:  ―[t]heir errand 
having failed in the first sense of the term, they were left with the 
second, and required to fill it with meaning by themselves and out of 
themselves.‖39  One manifestation of this new introspection can be seen 
in a synod of Puritan clergy and lay elders who convened in Boston in 
1679.40  After engaging in a collective examination of conscience, the 
                                                 
33 PERRY MILLER, ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS (Belknap Press of Harv. Univ. 1978) 
(1956). 
34 Id. at 11. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 King Charles II, SPARTACUS EDUCATIONAL, http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/ 
STUcharles2.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2010).  After Charles II assumed the throne, the pro-
Royalist Parliament passed the Act of Uniformity, making Puritan acts of worship illegal.  
Id.  Puritans also lost their power in politics:  they were forbidden from serving in the 
House of Commons.  Id.  Additionally, Puritans were barred from universities and from all 
teaching positions.  Id. 
38 MILLER, supra note 33, at 15. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 7–8; BERCOVITCH, supra note 27, at 5–6. 
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synod essentially issued a twelve-count indictment carefully cataloguing 
the moral failures of the community.41 
The synod‘s criticisms had a profound impact on New England 
Puritans.  Miller writes that the report became a veritable ―handbook for 
preachers.‖42  The standard sermon would begin with the preacher 
taking a verse from Isaiah or Jeremiah.  He would then remind the 
congregation that God would avenge the evil done by his chosen people; 
and the preacher would then go through the twelve categories adding, 
when possible, the even more evil things the community had done since 
the report was published. In reviewing these early American 
―jeremiads,‖ Miller states that ―in the whole literature of the 
world . . . there is hardly such another uninhibited and unrelenting 
documentation of a people‘s descent into corruption.‖43  Miller contends 
that the New England jeremiad is America‘s first distinctive literary 
genre.44 
It is here that Bercovitch parts company with Miller‘s analysis.  
Bercovitch contends that Miller‘s focus on the cataloguing of sins places 
too dark a spin on the jeremiad.  On the contrary, Bercovitch emphasizes 
―[the] pervasive theme of affirmation and exultation‖ that runs through 
the American, as opposed to the European, jeremiad.45  The Puritans 
continued to believe that they were God‘s chosen people.  Bercovitch 
focuses on the ―unshakable optimism‖ in the American jeremiad, 
including its ―promise of ultimate success.‖46 
And here is where Melville‘s distinction between chronometricals and 
horologicals becomes germane.  The lecture in Pierre warns that a man 
must not assume that his own local, horological sense of time is 
universally applicable; he needs to be aware that the chronometer keeps 
a different time that is accurate in a different way.  So, too, the moral 
standards contained in human horologicals may be quite different from 
those higher standards contained in the heavenly chronometer.  
Nevertheless, the lecturer insists, ―it follows not from this, that God‘s 
truth is one thing and man‘s truth another; but—as above hinted, and as 
                                                 
41 MILLER, supra note 33, 7–8.  What Miller refers to as ―a staggering compendium of 
iniquity‖ was arranged under twelve headings:  first, a ―decay of godliness‖; second, 
personal manifestations of pride; third, heresy; fourth, swearing as well as sleeping during 
sermons; fifth, Sabbath violations; sixth, a breakdown in discipline within families; seventh, 
increasing litigiousness; eighth, increase in alcohol use and sexual misconduct; ninth, 
increased lying; tenth, decrease in business ethics; eleventh, refusal to reform; and twelfth, 
a dearth of civic spirit.  Id. 
42 Id. at 8. 
43 Id. 
44 BERCOVITCH, supra note 27, at 6. 
45 Id. at 6–7. 
46 Id. at 7. 
O'Neill: Constitutional Argument as Jeremiad
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
40 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
will be further elucidated in subsequent lectures—by their very 
contradictions they are made to correspond.‖47  
How does this occur?  As noted above, we do not know because ―the 
pamphlet was torn, and came to a most untidy termination.‖48 
But for Bercovitch this difference between the horological and 
chronometrical, between man‘s truth and God‘s truth, is not meant to 
yield a final answer or resolution.  Rather, it provides the blueprint for a 
process.  For Bercovitch, the American jeremiad‘s continual complaint 
about man‘s failure to live up to God‘s standard—or as he expresses it, 
the continual lamentation concerning ―a growing discrepancy between 
fact and ideal‖49—was not meant to describe a historical position.  
Rather, it explains a ―mode of rhetoric.‖50  The lamentation is a rhetorical 
―strategy‖ that is used ―for prodding the community forward.‖51  And, 
reflecting Melville‘s fictional lecturer‘s contention that the contradictions 
between horologicals and chronometricals may actually be made to 
correspond, the American jeremiad reflected ―the belief that fact and 
ideal would be made to correspond.‖52 
IV.  JEREMIAD AS A PROCESS 
The structure of the American jeremiad is thus comprised of three 
steps:  1) an invocation of a standard to be lived up to; 2) a 
demonstration of how the current behavior of the people has fallen short 
of that standard; and 3) a presentation of a vision of the future when the 
people (as God‘s chosen ones) return to that standard. 
In his chapter entitled ―Ritual of Consensus,‖53 Bercovitch further 
asserts that the jeremiad became a ―national ritual‖ in American political 
life.54  For example, the Federalists seized on ―the Revolution‖ as the 
divine chronometer and opposed it to rebellion in a broad sense, which 
needed to be curbed or restrained.55  Whether it was insurgents 
complaining about taxation through Shays‘ Rebellion or debtors looking 
for relief from state governments, all could be painted as mere rebels 
deviating from the hallowed values of the Revolution. 
                                                 
47 PIERRE, supra note 14, at 212 (emphasis added). 
48 Id. at 215. 
49 BERCOVITCH, supra note 27, at 61. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 132–75. 
54 Id. at 132. 
55 Id. at 134–36. 
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As the Nineteenth Century wore on, the issue became which party 
could claim the mantle of the Revolution:  who were the troublesome 
rebels and who were the true supporters of American revolutionary 
ideals?  Bercovitch notes that ―[i]n virtually every area of life, the 
jeremiad became the official ritual form of continuing revolution.‖56  For 
example, when Whigs faced off against Jacksonian Democrats in the 
1830‘s, ―both parties agreed that the nation was in a crisis of identity, and 
both parties, each from its own perspective, proposed the same solution.  
They sought to stabilize society by rallying their countrymen, once again, 
to the chronometer of continuing revolution.‖57 
A. The Jeremiad and Constitutional Interpretation 
It is interesting to examine how constitutional argument has 
absorbed this structure of the American jeremiad.  The dynamic of the 
jeremiad—defining the standard, showing how we currently fall short, 
and then demonstrating how the current failure can be rectified through 
return to the ancient standard—is similar to the dynamic of 
constitutional argument in general. 
Consider Jack Balkin‘s recent work in constitutional interpretation 
where he distinguishes between what he calls the ―original meaning‖ of 
a constitutional text as opposed to the ―original expected application‖ of the 
text.58  As an example, he cites Justice Scalia‘s approach to the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.  Scalia has 
written that the value underlying this clause ―is not a moral principle of 
‗cruelty‘ that philosophers can play with in the future, but rather the 
existing society‘s assessment of what [was] cruel [in 1791]. . . . It is, in 
other words, rooted in the moral perceptions of the time.‖59  Scalia would 
thus answer the question of whether the death penalty violates the 
Eighth Amendment by asking how people living in 1791 would have 
answered the question.60  Balkin refers to Scalia‘s version of originalism 
as constituting a search for the ―original expected application.‖61 
Balkin then contrasts this with what he contends should be the 
proper inquiry:  the quest for the ―original meaning‖ of a constitutional 
clause. In searching for the ―original meaning,‖ Balkin contends that we 
                                                 
56 Id. at 141. 
57 Id. at 143. 
58 Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 292 (2007) 
(emphasis added).  A fuller discussion of this may be found in my article Scalia’s Poker:  
Puzzles and Mysteries in Constitutional Interpretation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 663 (2007). 
59 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 145 
(Amy Gutman ed., 1997) (emphasis added). 
60 Id. 
61  Balkin, supra, note 58, at 293 (emphasis added). 
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must look not only to the text but to the principles underlying the text.62  
What is ―cruel and unusual‖ must be determined by ―contemporary 
application‖ of this constitutional command.63  According to Balkin, each 
generation ―must take responsibility for interpreting and implementing 
the Constitution in its own era.‖64 
Balkin‘s ―original meaning‖ theory treats a constitutional provision 
such as the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause as a chronometer.  It 
treats the clause as a standard that exists outside of time.  It functions as 
a challenge to our narrow, local, horological sense of justice.  And the 
form of Balkin‘s argument follows the jeremiad:  first, the invocation of 
the aspirational ―heavenly chronometer‖ in the form of a constitutional 
provision challenging us to live up to an ideal; second, a description of 
how we have currently strayed from that ideal; third, a demonstration 
that by correcting this wrong we will merely be returning to the 
chronometric standard we have always embraced. 
But unlike Balkin‘s chronometrical interpretive method, Justice 
Scalia‘s is unabashedly horological.  The meaning of ―cruel and unusual‖ 
to Scalia is ―rooted in the moral perceptions of the time‖ it was adopted in 
1791.65  While Balkin sees ―cruel and unusual‖ as an evolving standard, 
Scalia views it as a fixed rule adopted in 1791. 
Note the similarity of Balkin‘s theory to Ronald Dworkin‘s 
distinction between constitutional concepts and conceptions.66  For 
example, Dworkin asserts that in considering whether segregated 
schools are unconstitutional, it is irrelevant that the Nineteenth Century 
authors of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
may have supported segregated schools. Dworkin asserts that ―equal 
protection‖ is a concept that admits of many and changing conceptions.  
The Clause constitutionalizes an aspirational concept that can support 
many different conceptions over time.67 
                                                 
62 Balkin, supra note 58, at 304. 
63 Id. at 295. 
64 Id. at 307.  See, for example, Justice John Paul Stevens‘ recent comments on 
interpreting the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment: 
Society changes.  Knowledge accumulates.  We learn, sometimes, from 
our mistakes.  Punishments that did not seem cruel and unusual at one 
time may, in the light of reason and experience, be found cruel and 
unusual at a later time . . . . Standards of decency have evolved since 
1980.  They will never stop doing so. 
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2036 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).  The most recent 
scholarly defense of this interpretaive position can be found in DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING 
CONSTITUTION (2010). 
65 SCALIA, supra note 59, at 145 (emphasis added). 
66 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 132–37 (1977). 
67 See id. at 223–29. 
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Applying Dworkin‘s theory to Balkin‘s hypothetical, we can say that 
since the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791, Americans have never 
wavered from accepting the chronometrical standard that forbids the use 
of cruel and unusual punishments.  Yet over the last two centuries, our 
view of precisely which punishments are ―cruel and unusual‖ has 
evolved.  Or, as Dworkin would express it, the concept of forbidding 
―cruel and unusual punishment‖ has not changed since 1791, but our 
conceptions of what is ―cruel and unusual‖ have changed. 
B. The Resolution of the Slavery Issue Demonstrates the Jeremiad as a Process 
This vision of the jeremiad as a process that continually challenges 
us to live up to chronometrical standards was expressed in a fresh way 
by Jedediah Purdy in his recent book A Tolerable Anarchy.68  Purdy begins 
by noting how easy it is to accuse the Founding Fathers of hypocrisy.  He 
points to Samuel Johnson‘s withering comment in 1775 about the 
colonists‘ repeated demands for ―liberty‖:  ―[w]hy is it that we hear the 
loudest yelps for liberty from the drivers of negroes?‖69  Yet Purdy 
argues that the very absurdity of a slave-holding nation talking about 
freedom and equality for all paradoxically made change all the more 
possible:  ―[a] doctrine of universal and inalienable rights could not 
easily uphold an order of hierarchy and oppression.‖70  If the promise of 
―freedom‖ did not exist in fact for many Americans, it certainly existed in 
theory. And the gap between theory and reality actually ―made the 
prophets of a possible America seem more American, sometimes, than the 
defenders of the country that actually existed.‖71 
The American promise of freedom for all can be seen as a 
chronometer.  It has provided an absolute measure against which 
America has continually come up short.  The paradox is that ―the 
founding principles gave ironic authority to those whom American 
                                                 
68 JEDEDIAH PURDY, A TOLERABLE ANARCHY:  REBELS, REACTIONARIES, AND THE MAKING 
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69 Id. at 5 (citing SAMUEL JOHNSON, TAXATION NO TYRANNY:  AN ANSWER TO THE 
RESOLUTIONS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS (Gale ECCO, Print Editions 2010) (1775)).  Jack 
Rakove has noted that Edmund Burke had a similar insight that ―[o]wning slaves made 
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68 (2010).  Even some Americans served by slaves had a similar realization.  Jack Laurens—
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society put down and kept out.‖72  And this meant that ―[i]t was not 
despite but because of its flaws‖73 that more and more Americans 
successfully demanded that freedom be extended to them.  As Purdy 
eloquently expresses it: 
Because the Declaration of Independence was absurdly 
remote from the practices of its author and many of its 
signatories, because its theory of government threatened 
perennial revolution, it became the touchstone of a 
constitutional tradition of freedom, called on by slaves, 
women, racial minorities, and gay people to redeem 
their dignity as Americans.74 
As an example of this dynamic, Purdy compares the mid-Nineteenth 
Century responses of William Lloyd Garrison and Frederick Douglass to 
the U.S. Constitution.75  Garrison, a white man and an abolitionist, 
despaired of using the Constitution to effect reform.  He famously 
described it as ―a covenant with death, and an agreement with hell.‖76 
But as an African-American, Frederick Douglass saw the possibilities 
inherent in the Constitution.  He viewed the constitutional guarantee of 
freedom not as a horological actually describing reality in antebellum 
America, but rather as a chronometric ideal.  In a Fourth of July speech 
in Rochester, New York, in 1852, Douglass supported this view by 
making an audacious claim: he said the Constitution ―interpreted as it 
ought to be interpreted . . . is a glorious liberty document.‖77  Similar to 
what Abraham Lincoln would do a decade later in the Gettysburg 
Address,78 Douglass insisted that the best way to understand the 
Constitution was to look at it through the powerful lens of the 
Declaration of Independence.  In Purdy‘s words, Douglass praised the 
Founders for refusing to provide ―a final answer for the question of 
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slavery‖; instead, they provided ―broad principles that later generations 
could use in shaping the eventual resolution.‖79 
Douglass‘s own words deserve close attention:  ―[w]ith [the 
Founders] nothing was ‗settled‘ that was not right.  With them, justice, 
liberty, and humanity were ‗final;‘ not slavery and oppression.‖80  And 
Purdy astutely notes that ―Douglass‘s version of constitutionalism 
confronted American injustice by asking the country not to surrender 
itself but to become itself.‖81 
Thus, Douglass‘s speech is the paradigmatic American jeremiad.  
First, Douglass recognizes that the high-minded ideals in the 
Constitution and Declaration were not horologicals describing the nation 
that existed in the Eighteenth Century; rather, they are chronometric 
values to which the country pledges to forever aspire.  Second, his 
description of mid-Nineteenth Century America shows the woeful state 
the country was in because of slavery.  Third, he urges that the solution 
to the current problems lies in a return to the Eighteenth Century:  not in 
the horological sense of a return to what America actually was, but 
rather a return in the chronometric sense to the aspirational values upon 
which the country was founded. 
Purdy contrasts Douglass‘s reading of the Constitution with Chief 
Justice Roger Taney‘s in the Dred Scott case.82  Unlike Douglass‘s view 
that the Constitution establishes values rather than rules, Taney held that 
the Constitution conclusively settled certain questions for all time:  thus, 
Dred Scott held that the racism of the Founders was indelibly written into 
the Constitution.83  In Balkin‘s terms, Douglass sought the ―original 
meaning,‖ while Taney sought the ―original expected application.‖ 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The American jeremiad—and constitutional interpretation, in 
general—invites each generation to return to the past.  But the goal is not 
for Americans to copy everything that was done in the past; rather, the 
goal is for Americans to re-dedicate themselves to the chronometric, 
eternal values expressed in the past, in both the Constitution and 
Declaration of Independence. 
Conceptions of justice constantly change; but the concept of justice 
does not.  We can never fully achieve a chronometric value; as in Zeno‘s 
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paradox, we can always get closer to the goal, but we will never reach it.  
But as Sacvan Bercovitch says, the American jeremiad provides a never-
ending process:  it is ―the official ritual form of continuing revolution.‖84 
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